|I look for no ordinary details | Notebook C | Discovering America | Credits and How I Work | toc ||
First Draft - In a tribal culture, when one person refuses an agreement, does he speak for himself or for a set of relationships? How many ways are there to say "no" in such a moral landscape? These are no longer military considerations of will and science but outcomes that define a civil partnership. If the counterpart wishes too keenly to say "yes," will he or she twist so much that his position becomes ineffectual?
Opinion: In Afg, the theater becomes obvious at this inflection point; Karzai does not wants foreign forces in Afg, and wishes to cultivate a lasting image at this late act; only at this turn does his refusal is apparent because he lengthened the denouement for as long as he could based on meticulous tidings. Recent example: He knows a fuel purchase is about to be approved; before then, he raises a false complaint that Isaf is withholding fuel delivery; when the contract is agreed, the implied message is that Karzai's complaint was quickly assuaged by the coalition. One could justify these posture before with the expectation that a signed agreement is the common mission.
The voices in America who write declarative sentences that it's only about one man omit a lot. Karzai is moving across the palace to a government-paid mansion to offer advice to his successor (per Nyt article this summer) which made this reader assume he would contribute to continuation (instead of leaving the country) but instead raises now the specter of perennial meddling by an inflated faction. Even though we knew it intellectually, to see a Cincinnatus return to his family owned farm after two terms is truly a remarkable political act.
There might be Chinese or Iranian interferences. A Marxist education will regard the Silk Road as its prerogative forgetting Afg 's dormant state when politics interfere. Q: No expert ever explains why India needs a position in Afg when any investment or civilian personnel trigger a Pakistani response by indirect means to distort peace (Thesis: Les manoeuvres sur la derriere was Napoleon's most successful strategy). It is possible to distinguish accomplished voices of Americans on the field, or of Moutain men who accept what is hard and want to strengthen the coalition in Afg. Dempsey's voice will make a big impact with the American public; what can be infered, he must know factually to bridge the civ-mil debate.
Inharmonious bravado by some Chinese
officials simply accelerates the adjustments to the
Asia-Pacific. Japan's direct links to the American National
Security table is one lasting attribute of a general trend among
Larger photo and
At the Oman Sultanate, we come across a
culture based on the Ibadi sect (distinct from Shia or Sunni),
visited by the first early modern navigators - the Portuguese -
which places a visitor at the gateway of the Gulf nations but
offers a vista towards the Pacific - America's homefront. Near
the waters of Oman, Cason, Smith working on the Phalanx; a laser
version coming soon to the Ponce in the same 5th area?
Mabus and P4 paraphrased: The state of a
ship depends on its people; the mature deck of the GW. Ref:photo.
Published Dec 4, 2013 for Notebook C. email@example.com
The International Criminal Court on Afg
First Draft - The November report from ICC reveals the track record of the coalition to minimize civilian deaths; by contrast, the reader learns what we always could deduce from the public record: The Taliban take refuge in civilian homes as a tactic to use civilian shields to defeat Isaf's offense (link; #30,pg 9). Manipulating the press every time a civilian is killed to raise hurdles for coalition forces, the public needs to look more carefully at the evidence. Only in the last two weeks has the press revealed the double standards of the Afg government.
We wonder: After 12 years of fighting together, it would be natural to expect a partner who pursues a common mission by making the difficult decisions rather than haggle like a suspicious fruit vendor who charges one price to Americans and another to everyone else. A Renaissance writer did warn us that a peoples unaccustomed to freedom take on self-rule with difficulty; coalition leaders demonstrated noble self-restraint as a trust-earning gesture and differentiated from the brutal Soviet methods which typically ignite Afghan revolt; thesis: The noble gesture seemingly defined a submissive posture in a culture that doesn't understand rule by partnership. Each province in Afg is unique and can be portrayed distinctively; in one, women fare better and the economy produces the highest public revenue; in another, Germans are keen to invest with the Bsa (eventhough reparations against Germans fighting the good fight on the field absolves them not). Elsewhere, the potential of reconciling with the obsessive voice might be better understood if we spend a day or a lifetime with a compulsive persona and attempt to decide on a movie title.
-A communications office managed by the Afg government and funded by the US which RESPONDS LIKE THIS to an American inquiry is shouting but who doesn't know the courtesies will be regarded incompetent or unwilling to nurture a conversation with the West. That government needs to earn the American Public's trust unless it soon remembers how many ships and planes it could have purchased instead. If a director of that same office studied in France, is he qualified to understand the US given all the temperamental attitudes prevalent there? Lafayette may have been America's best friend (plus one French department still), but in a modern country where a foreign term is vigilantly subjected to a committee's translation may very well enhance the proud habits of an unsuspecting foreign student; this weird tid bits of complaints heard about England and historical English designs is a trend outdated to an educated person. If the same office calls Americans "cruel" while an unrelated spiritual teacher calls the west "unkind" are the two not actively coordinated to one another? If the same office writes to America only when a tragedy kills kids at an elementary school, is the writer not imparting blackmail by starting the paragraph by how Afghans know such pain? What is left unsaid during tornadoes and deadliest storms would not be indicative if the writer had remained silent during all tragedies. In sum, the office reports gratitude towards China, declares India as shy, promotes interaction by all neighbors while standing on a pulpit and considers America as an occupier based on the following definition: When the US does not do what is asked, it is an occupier; by that measure, the US will work hard to maintain its good standing.
-Most dictators telegraph what they're about to do in copious writing; it's an oddity that can be put to good use by the inquisitive reader. In response to a Chinese interviewer in September, the same Afghan office publishes comments to show its government's fortitude and intentions to survive without western help, and how such a fate will not be the end of life. Another reporter from India, questioning Chinese motives, is told that all nations can participate (as in a region like the EU without internal borders - an original and inspired idea executed by wishful thinking) while suggesting Indian police and army training as gifts. To Newsweek, the office reports that continued international assistance is required but that continued international presence is not. It must be said: a Newsweek reporter who asks what mistakes an Afghan leader has made imports American reporters' way of talking in the US but exports such an unfamiliar custom towards a foreign culture. The remarks of the office may be cavalier talk where parties posture for dominance, whereby Americans on the field can differentiate the spectrum of intent. Such comments made, however, followed by earlier restrictions on special forces' access in Wardak, or American air support reinforce one objective in this reader's mind. It's possible to detect the grammatical-draft of a manipulatively clever but unintelligent writer who will interject specific needs after 'suffering' so much.
-By contrast, another foreign office spokesman relates:“Islamic Republic of Iran does not consider the signing and approval of the pact useful for the long term expedience and interests of Afghanistan. We think approval and implementation of the deal will have negative effects on the trend of regional issues.” The sentence clearly states and announces the Iranian position well enough. Further in another page, we read "Mohammad Javad Zarif said on Tuesday that the pullout of the US-led foreign troops from Afghanistan would eliminate the grounds for extremism and pave the way for the progress and welfare of the Afghan people. " while another paragraph states: "During the Tuesday meeting, Zarif also expressed Tehran’s readiness to boost cooperation with Kabul in various fields which would set the stage for fighting extremism, war, narcotics trafficking and resolving the problems in border areas." ref
So Iran will have to fight extremism even without US presence in Afg, but presumably fought in another way. The Supreme Leader's defense posture against invasion is confidently evident in the historical record, while Iranian outreach in the Persianate field reaches east along a defined path in Afg which reshapes the field into a binary map.
In the Central region, Afg cannot be seen in isolation given the geo-political shifts (per one competent writer) and encourages this present writer to look for the constants and to focus his attention towards such gravity points. Watching the Iraqi Foreign minister with the Afghan, only demosntrated how few presence, as in present Iraq, can train and advise a nation that apparently hates foreign voices. The tension between open and close societies (e.g. Athens vers Sparta) is as old as the civilization timeline.
Published Dec 3, 2013 for Notebook C. firstname.lastname@example.org